How does this sort of thing go down? Bruno says "we'll send it to this, this and that journal, and that one and that other one"? "Some of our audience won't understand this paper, so let's publish an identical one"? Is it all him, and you don't feel that you can speak up, or did you agree with this stuff?
BF's co-authors: want to defend yourselves?
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Let's make a list:
Stutzer (joint with Frey, now at Zurich) doesn't mention his 2000 Journal of Happiness Economics paper, which is similar to his 2000 Economic journal paper paper. Both are about effects of unemployment, inflation, income and democracy on happiness and that economists should measure this. Their 2000 German Economic Review paper is on the same topic with the same results
Stutzer (joint with Frey, now at Zurich) doesn't mention his 2002 World economics paper, which is similar to his 2002 Journal of economic literature paper. Both are about effects of unemployment, inflation, income and democracy on happiness and that economists should measure this
Stutzer (joint with Frey, now at Zurich) also wrote a 2010 Public Choice paper on the effects of unemployment, inflation, income and democracy on happiness and that economists should measure this. They only mention the JEL paper
Meier (joint with Frey, now at Columbia) wrote a 2004 AER paper and a 2004 Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization paper. Both used the same data to show that people give more to charity if they know that others do too. Papers do not cite each other
Meier (joint with Frey, now at Columbia) wrote a 2003 Economic Inquiry paper, a 2004 International Journal of the Economics of Business paper and a 2005 European Law and Economics paper. All three have identical abstracts
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Rost, Inauen and Osterloh (all at Zurich) wrote three similar papers with Frey, published in 2010:
Abstract of the paper in Journal of Management History 2010:
"The monasteries that are examined show an average lifetime of almost 500 years and only a quarter of them dissolved as a result of agency problems. This paper argues that this success is due to an appropriate governance structure that relies strongly on internal control mechanisms."Abstract of the paper in the American Review of Public Administration 2010:
"Benedictine monasteries in Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, and German-speaking Switzerland have an average lifetime of almost 500 years, and only a quarter of them broke up because of agency problems. The authors argue that they were able to survive for centuries because of an appropriate governance structure, relying strongly on the intrinsic motivation of the members and internal control mechanisms."Abstract of the paper in the Management Revue - The international Review of Management Studies 2010:
"Derived from an analysis of the Benedictine monastery of Engelberg we offer three improvements of applied governance designed to reduce agency problems. First, monastic governance emphasizes clan control rather than output control. Monasteries demonstrate that organizations can prevent agency problems by complementing external discipline with internal behavioral incentives, such as value systems and voice." -
Jegen (at Zurich) and Frey wrote two similar papers
From the conclusion of the Annals of Economics and Statistics 2001 paper:
"Many scholars have accepted the theoretical possibility of crowding effects, i. e. that an external intervention via monetary incentives or punishments may undermine (and under different indentifiable conditions strengthen) intrinsic motivation. But many of them have een critical about the empirical relevance of the crowding effects. This paper shows that this skepticism is unwarranted and that there exists indeed compelling empirical evidence for the existence of crowding out and crowding in. This conclusion is based on circumstantial evidence, laboratory evidence by both psychologists and economists as well as field evidence by econometric studies."From the abstract of the 2001 Journal of Economic Surveys paper:
Many scholars have accepted the theoretical possibility of crowding effects, i. e. that an external intervention via monetary incentives or punishments may undermine (and under different indentifiable conditions strengthen) intrinsic motivation. But many of them have been critical about the empirical relevance of the crowding effects. This paper shows that this skepticism is unwarranted and that there exists indeed compelling empirical evidence for the existence of crowding out and crowding in. This conclusion is based on circumstantial evidence, laboratory evidence by both psychologists and economists as well as field evidence by econometric studies. -
^mistake, should be:
Jegen (at Zurich) and Frey wrote two similar papers
From the conclusion of the Annals of Economics and Statistics 2001 paper:
"Many scholars have accepted the theoretical possibility of crowding effects, i. e. that an external intervention via monetary incentives or punishments may undermine (and under different indentifiable conditions strengthen) intrinsic motivation. But many of them have een critical about the empirical relevance of the crowding effects. This paper shows that this skepticism is unwarranted and that there exists indeed compelling empirical evidence for the existence of crowding out and crowding in. This conclusion is based on circumstantial evidence, laboratory evidence by both psychologists and economists as well as field evidence by econometric studies."From the abstract of the 2001 Journal of Economic Surveys paper:
"As of today, the theoretical possibility of motivation crowding has been the main subject of discussion among economists. This study demonstrates that the effect is also of empirical relevance. There exist a large number of studies, offering empirical evidence in support of the existence of crowding–out and crowding–in. The study is based on circumstantial evidence, laboratory studies by both psychologists and economists, as well as field research by econometric studies. " -
Marcel Kucher (now in the management board of Peach Property Group) and Frey wrote the following articles. Mind the first sentence of all abstracts.
Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics 1998 paper, abstract:
"Historical events are reflected in asset prices. In this paper we therefore analyze the prices of Swiss government bonds traded during WWII. The econometric analysis reveals that some events that are generally considered crucial for the military threat Switzerland faced, are clearly reflected in government bond prices. This holds, in particular, for events that occured before the official outbreak of the war. The most prominent examples are the Nazi takeover in Januray 1933 or the introduction of the draft for military service in March 1935. On the other hand, some events to which historians attach great attention are not reflected in bond prices at all: The most prominent example is the German capitulation in 1945. The analysis of financial markets is certainly no substitute to the traditional inquiries undertaken by historians. But it is a challenging complementaiy method to evaluate particular sentiments existing at a given moment of time."Empirica 1999 paper, did not cite earlier work, abstract:
Historical events are reflected in asset prices. Looking at Austrian government bond prices
traded on the Swiss stock exchange during WWII provides therefore a useful way of interpreting the importance the thousands of people directly and indirectly engaged in stock markets attributed to various war events. An econometric analysis of the relationship between government bond values and events in Austrian history reveals that some generally considered crucial events connected with WWII are clearly reflected in Austrian government bond prices.Journal of Economic History 2000 paper, did not cite earlier work, abstract:
"Historical events are reflected in asset prices. We analyze movements in the price of
bonds issued by five European governments and traded on the Swiss bourse between
1928 and 1948, with special attention to the war years. Some war events that are generally
considered crucial are clearly reflected in government bond prices. This holds, in
particular, for the official outbreak of the war and changes in national sovereignty. But
other events to which historians attach great importance are notreflected in bond prices,
most prominently Germany’s capitulation in 1945."Economics Letters 2000 paper, did not cite earlier work, abstract:
"Historical events are reflected in asset prices. We analyze government bond prices of five European countries traded on the Swiss bourse during WWII. Apart from the official outbreak of WWII, loss and gain of national sovereignty influenced the capital market."Economica 2001 paper, did not cite earlier work, abstract:
"Historical events are reflected in asset prices. Based on a unique data-set, we analyse
government bond prices of Germany and Austria traded on the Swiss bourse during the
Second World War. Some war events generally considered crucial are clearly reflected in
governmenbt ond prices;t his holds, in particularf,o r the officialo utbreako f the war and the loss and gain of national sovereignty. Other events to which historians attach great
importance are not reflected in bond prices, most prominently Germany's capitulation in
1945. The analysis of financial markets provides a fruitful method for evaluating the
importance contemporaries attached to historical events." -
BF's behavior is disgusting in the extreme. Reading the abstracts posted by dc43 makes me want to puke. The strange thing, though, is that all these publications are in really crappy journals. I know that this is how they got away with it for so long ... who in the hell reads the Journal of Management History? But really, with 600 publications on your resume one would think the added value of an additional one in the Swiss Journal of Statistics is nil. It is outweighed even by the rather minimal cost of switching a couple phrases around or paying the RA to do it. So either this scumbag has severe narcissistic tendencies, or he was selling faux co-authorship to his much less well-known collaborators for money or other considerations.
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I completely agree with this. Why do this at all? Why publish an AER paper on charitable giving in 5 other journals that are complete shit?
BF's behavior is disgusting in the extreme. Reading the abstracts posted by dc43 makes me want to puke. The strange thing, though, is that all these publications are in really crappy journals. I know that this is how they got away with it for so long ... who in the hell reads the Journal of Management History? But really, with 600 publications on your resume one would think the added value of an additional one in the Swiss Journal of Statistics is nil. It is outweighed even by the rather minimal cost of switching a couple phrases around or paying the RA to do it. So either this scumbag has severe narcissistic tendencies, or he was selling faux co-authorship to his much less well-known collaborators for money or other considerations.
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This is the point. It is good that ejmr circulates news about plagiarism but I think we should stop at this. We don't know the motivations and then it does not make sense at all to say Frey is a loser, is stupid or everything else. We should stop to describe facts and eventually to guess potential motivations.
I completely agree with this. Why do this at all? Why publish an AER paper on charitable giving in 5 other journals that are complete shit?
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Simon Luechinger (University of Luzern) and Frey wrote:
2003 Defence Peace Economics, abstract:
"Deterrence has been a crucial element in fighting terrorism, both in actual politics and rational choice analyses of terrorism. But there are superior strategies to deterrence. One is to make terrorist attacks less attractive. Another to raise the opportunity cost – rather than the material cost – to terrorists. These alternative strategies effectively dissuade potential terrorists. The strategies suggested here build on the benevolence” system and tend to produce a positive sum game among the interacting parties."2004 Journal of Political Economy (did cite previous paper), abstract:
"Consideration of anti-terrorism policy has focused almost exclusively on deterrence that seeks to fend off terrorism by raising the costs of undertaking terrorist acts. This paper suggests an alternative approach to anti-terrorism policy that is based on reducing the expected benefits of undertaking terrorist acts to prospective terrorists rather than raising the costs of doing so. Specifically, it is argued that strengthening decentralized decision-making in the polity and economy provides disincentives for terrorist attacks."Chapter in the book The Economic analysis of terrorism 2007, conclusion:
"As the preceding discussion suggests, strengthening decentralized decisionmaking may be an effective antidote against terrorist attacks"Chapter in the book The Economic Costs and Consequences of Terrorism 2007, introduction:
"In this chapter we argue that there are superior strategies to deterrence ... terrorists can be effectively dissuaded from attacking either if the utility of committing an attack to the terrorist is lowered or if the opportunity cost is raised. We propose three strategies to deal with terrorists, first two aiming at lowering the utility (...) third attempting to raise opportunity costs"2008 Economic Papers: A journal of applied economics and policy (did cite previous papers), abstract:
"Deterrence has been a crucial element in fighting terrorism. An economic analysis of terrorism also points to alternative and potentially superior policies. We suggest three policies that can well be integrated into existing constitutions of democratic and rule-based countries. Two policies are based on diminishing the benefits of committing terrorist acts for prospective terrorists. This can be done by decentralising various parts of society or by diverting attention from terrorists, once a terrorist act has been committed. A third policy is to raise the relative costs of terrorism by lowering the costs of non-violent means for pursuing political goals." -
Luechinger, Stutzer and Frey wrote:
Journal of Economic Surveys 2007, abstract:
The trends and consequences of terrorist activities are often captured
by counting the number of incidents and casualties. More recently, the effects of
terrorist acts on various aspects of the economy have been analyzed. These costs
are surveyed and put in perspective. As economic consequences are only a part
of the overall costs of terrorism, possible approaches for estimating the utility
losses of the people affected are discussed. Results using the life satisfaction
approach, in which individual utility is approximated by self-reported subjective
well-being, suggest that people’s utility losses may far exceed the purely economic
consequences.Public Choice 2009 (did cite the previous one), abstract:
Terrorism has large social costs that are difficult to quantify for the well-known
problems of eliciting people’s preferences for public goods. We use the LSA to assess these
costs in utility and monetary terms. Based on combined cross-section time-series data, we
estimate the costs of terrorism for France and the British Isles.We find large negative effects of terrorism on life satisfaction that translate into considerable compensating surpluses for a hypothetical reduction in terrorism, in particular for the serious conflict in Northern Ireland. The effects of terrorism are robust and differ across groups in accordance with prior expectations. -
It is unbelievable. It's obvious that if he has 600 articles, something was wrong. Recently we have seen an official documentation about this. Then, it is so useless and stupid looking for paste© paragraphs from 10 years ago papers. Instead, you are totally uninterested into understand true motivations and (dis)incentives about this story. You are definitely LRM. Your mind works in that way. Go back to your regressions and say hello to Cheeta.