https://sites.google.com/view/ellora-derenoncourt/research
since when is documenting heterogeneity (wrt race\gender) in impact evaluations sufficient for a top 5?
Derenoncourt has a QJE r&r
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Could someone with a brain please discuss the substance of the paper?
So many jealous losers on this forum. She has to be better than Berkeley’s last policy-type hire, GZ.Of course they are allowed to be jealous. You think it’s easy to have 1 or 0 QJE 20 years after PhD? No it’s not easy. It’s painful. I am only 2 or 3 years out, and I am already burning for a top 5. Now imagine those 20 years out??
So the jealousy is perhaps understandable. However, they should control it, as adults.
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Why don't you read her paper? It's a simple DiD. Martha Bailey has already done something like that. So it's not even an original paper.
Could someone with a brain please discuss the substance of the paper?
So many jealous losers on this forum. She has to be better than Berkeley’s last policy-type hire, GZ.Of course they are allowed to be jealous. You think it’s easy to have 1 or 0 QJE 20 years after PhD? No it’s not easy. It’s painful. I am only 2 or 3 years out, and I am already burning for a top 5. Now imagine those 20 years out??
So the jealousy is perhaps understandable. However, they should control it, as adults. -
Here are the differences of the two papers, according to the authors. Bailey's paper is R&R at JOLE while this is R&R at QJE. Judge for yourself if there is any corruption.
We identify four main differences in our empirical analyses.
First, our samples of interest differ. Whereas Bailey et al. (2018) focus exclusively on men, aged 16-64, we analyze the employment effects across all men and women aged 25-55. In particular, we do not include teens who, below 21, are subject to a different minimum wage policy, and older workers (55-64
years old). These two subgroups might be more vulnerable and face larger negative demand employment elasticities. We do not include men of draft age (between 18 and 25 years old), as the inclusion of this subgroup might lead to negative biases in the overall employment results if enrollment in the Vietnam War is contemporaneous to the implementation of the minimum wage reform, and if enrollment rates are higher in states also strongly affected by the reform. Because these strongly affected states happen to be states where black workers were overrepresented and because black workers were slightly overrepresented among soldiers, the inclusion of this subgroup might lead to more severe negative biases among black men.Second, we measure employment and wage outcomes differently. While Bailey et al.
(2018) measure employment elasticities with respect to a reconstructed measure of average hourly wages in the CPS, we measure employment elasticities w.r.t average annual earnings, which are directly reported in the CPS. This difference does not seem to explain the difference in the employment elasticity estimates however, as our earnings effect using the cross state
design seems to be slightly smaller than the hourly wage effect reported in Bailey et al. (2018).Third, the two papers use slightly different control variables. Notably, Bailey et al. (2018) include state-by-cohort fixed effects in their preferred specification (see column 3 of their table 3 p.28) – which they show turn their main employment elasticity from a small positive into a
small negative one. Although we do not include this precise control, we include a quadratic in age at the individual level in all of our employment regressions.
A fourth difference consists of a difference in the empirical approach, and most importantly, in the measure of the variation in the bite of the minimum wage reform across states. We compare employment outcomes in states that are strongly treated vs. weakly treated based on whether states had their own minimum wage law or not as of January 1966. This
design attempts to capture differences in the extension of minimum wage coverage to new sectors of the economy – the reform we analyze in this paper. By contrast, Bailey et al. (2018) exploit differences across states in the share of workers below the new minimum wage of 1968 ($1.60 in nominal terms), attempting to capture the effect of both the extension in coverage
across sectors and nationwide minimum wage increases for all sectors in the economy in 1967 and 1968. The two designs may be getting at different LATEs. It may be the case that for the subset of African American compliers using the share of workers with wages below $1.60 treatment, there is a slightly more negative effect than for African American compliers in the state-pre-existing law definition of treatment.A fourth difference consists of a difference in the empirical approach, and most importantly, in the measure of the variation in the bite of the minimum wage reform across states.
We compare employment outcomes in states that are strongly treated vs. weakly treated based on whether states had their own minimum wage law or not as of January 1966. This design attempts to capture differences in the extension of minimum wage coverage to new sectors of the economy – the reform we analyze in this pap...See full post -
Yes, good luck getting past desk reject with a similar paper without any connections.
Here are the differences of the two papers, according to the authors. Bailey's paper is R&R at JOLE while this is R&R at QJE. Judge for yourself if there is any corruption.
We identify four main differences in our empirical analyses.
First, our samples of interest differ. Whereas Bailey et al. (2018) focus exclusively on men, aged 16-64, we analyze the employment effects across all men and women aged 25-55. In particular, we do not include teens who, below 21, are subject to a different minimum wage policy, and older workers (55-64
years old). These two subgroups might be more vulnerable and face larger negative demand employment elasticities. We do not include men of draft age (between 18 and 25 years old), as the inclusion of this subgroup might lead to negative biases in the overall employment results if enrollment in the Vietnam War is contemporaneous to the implementation of the minimum wage reform, and if enrollment rates are higher in states also strongly affected by the reform. Because these strongly affected states happen to be states where black workers were overrepresented and because black workers were slightly overrepresented among soldiers, the inclusion of this subgroup might lead to more severe negative biases among black men.
Second, we measure employment and wage outcomes differently. While Bailey et al.
(2018) measure employment elasticities with respect to a reconstructed measure of average hourly wages in the CPS, we measure employment elasticities w.r.t average annual earnings, which are directly reported in the CPS. This difference does not seem to explain the difference in the employment elasticity estimates however, as our earnings effect using the cross state
design seems to be slightly smaller than the hourly wage effect reported in Bailey et al. (2018).
Third, the two papers use slightly different control variables. Notably, Bailey et al. (2018) include state-by-cohort fixed effects in their preferred specification (see column 3 of their table 3 p.28) – which they show turn their main employment elasticity from a small positive into a
small negative one. Although we do not include this precise control, we include a quadratic in age at the individual level in all of our employment regressions.
A fourth difference consists of a difference in the empirical approach, and most importantly, in the measure of the variation in the bite of the minimum wage reform across states. We compare employment outcomes in states that are strongly treated vs. weakly treated based on whether states had their own minimum wage law or not as of January 1966. This
design attempts to capture differences in the extension of minimum wage coverage to new sectors of the economy – the reform we analyze in this paper. By contrast, Bailey et al. (2018) exploit differences across states in the share of workers below the new minimum wage of 1968 ($1.60 in nominal terms), attempting to capture the effect of both the extension in coverage
across sectors and nationwide minimum wage increases for all sectors in the economy in 1967 and 1968. The two designs may be getting at different LATEs. It may be the case that for the subset of African American compliers using the share of workers with wages below $1.60 treatment, there is a slightly more negative effect than for African American compliers in the state-pre-existing law definition of treatment.
A fourth difference consists of a difference in the empirical approach, and most importantly, in the measure of the variation in the bite of the minimum wage reform across states.
We compare employment outcomes in states that are strongly treated vs. weakly treated based on whether states had their own minimum wage law or not as of January 1966. This design attempts to capture differences in the exten...See full post -
Since s he is a b lack wimmin in economics working on r ace-related stuff
HOW. DARE. YOU. insinuate that somebody was gifted a QJE due to her gender or race. She EARNED that QJE by having a past affiliation with Harvard.
- person who hasn't read her paper, isn't in her field, and has no QJE (ergo no affiliation with Harvard)
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Also see how Bailey et Al cited ED. Not flattering at all. Obviously Katz didn't call on the authors of the most related paper to referee, how corrupt is that
Here are the differences of the two papers, according to the authors. Bailey's paper is R&R at JOLE while this is R&R at QJE. Judge for yourself if there is any corruption.
We identify four main differences in our empirical analyses.
First, our samples of interest differ. Whereas Bailey et al. (2018) focus exclusively on men, aged 16-64, we analyze the employment effects across all men and women aged 25-55. In particular, we do not include teens who, below 21, are subject to a different minimum wage policy, and older workers (55-64
years old). These two subgroups might be more vulnerable and face larger negative demand employment elasticities. We do not include men of draft age (between 18 and 25 years old), as the inclusion of this subgroup might lead to negative biases in the overall employment results if enrollment in the Vietnam War is contemporaneous to the implementation of the minimum wage reform, and if enrollment rates are higher in states also strongly affected by the reform. Because these strongly affected states happen to be states where black workers were overrepresented and because black workers were slightly overrepresented among soldiers, the inclusion of this subgroup might lead to more severe negative biases among black men.
Second, we measure employment and wage outcomes differently. While Bailey et al.
(2018) measure employment elasticities with respect to a reconstructed measure of average hourly wages in the CPS, we measure employment elasticities w.r.t average annual earnings, which are directly reported in the CPS. This difference does not seem to explain the difference in the employment elasticity estimates however, as our earnings effect using the cross state
design seems to be slightly smaller than the hourly wage effect reported in Bailey et al. (2018).
Third, the two papers use slightly different control variables. Notably, Bailey et al. (2018) include state-by-cohort fixed effects in their preferred specification (see column 3 of their table 3 p.28) – which they show turn their main employment elasticity from a small positive into a
small negative one. Although we do not include this precise control, we include a quadratic in age at the individual level in all of our employment regressions.
A fourth difference consists of a difference in the empirical approach, and most importantly, in the measure of the variation in the bite of the minimum wage reform across states. We compare employment outcomes in states that are strongly treated vs. weakly treated based on whether states had their own minimum wage law or not as of January 1966. This
design attempts to capture differences in the extension of minimum wage coverage to new sectors of the economy – the reform we analyze in this paper. By contrast, Bailey et al. (2018) exploit differences across states in the share of workers below the new minimum wage of 1968 ($1.60 in nominal terms), attempting to capture the effect of both the extension in coverage
across sectors and nationwide minimum wage increases for all sectors in the economy in 1967 and 1968. The two designs may be getting at different LATEs. It may be the case that for the subset of African American compliers using the share of workers with wages below $1.60 treatment, there is a slightly more negative effect than for African American compliers in the state-pre-existing law definition of treatment.
A fourth difference consists of a difference in the empirical approach, and most importantly, in the measure of the variation in the bite of the minimum wage reform across states.
We compare employment outcomes in states that are strongly treated vs. weakly treated based on whether states had their own minimum wage law or not as ...See full post -
If this paper is just saying that a particular regulation contributed to the movement of a particular statistic in a certain direction, and there is already another paper published that says the same thing, then this is obvious corruption.
So many reg monkey papers like this. Economics isn't a hard science - it doesn't matter *how* you calculate the effect (nevermind that these two papers do it in almost the exact same way) because it's all just storytelling anyway. If your story is the same then your paper is the same bottom line.