Remember how AER wouldn’t let Brett Matsumoto include in his acknowledgements "I would like to acknowledge the support of anonymous economists at econjobrumors.com who played a critical role in helping me to formulate the ideas contained within this note"? https://www.econjobrumors.com/topic/new-family-ruptures-aer-nber-is-rip-off-of-obscure-paper/page/255, https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/72444/ . That was wrong, of course.
Here’s your chance to pay them back. I have a working paper I will submit to AER. I’d like comments on it from you. If I get in (big "if", of course-- let's say, “Wherever I get in”) I’ll require thanks to EJMR or I’ll retract the article and submit elsewhere. There's a condition, though. I will follow my usual "thanks" policy of only providing thanks if EJMR (a) has a comment that results in me making a change to the paper, or (b) has comments that look like somebody put some effort into them, even though they turned out to be useless.
I am, of course, prepared to endure your recreational comments too, e.g. (a) Your paper is just more useless theoretical I.O. and we’re sick of it, (b) Your paper’s math isn’t hard, so you're stupid, or (c) I hate you because you went to MIT.
Here's the abstract and web address:
Competitive Hold-Up: Monopoly Prices Are Too High
To Maximize Profits when Retailers or Complements Are Perfectly Competitive. If a monopolist cannot commit to a wholesale price in advance, even competitive retailers will be reluctant to enter the market, knowing that once they have entered the monopolist has incentive to choose a higher price and reduce their quasi-rents. Retailers earn zero profits in the long run, but this hurts the monopolist by shifting in the retailer short-run supply curve. I call this competitive hold-up''. A similar problem occurs if the monopolist's product is sold directly to consumers but is complementary to a product sold by a competitive industry. Competitive hold-up arises from upstream opportunism, not downstream market power, and so is distinct from double marginalization and the two-monopoly complements externality. http://rasmusen.org/papers/holdup-rasmusen.pdf.
One comment that would be particularly useful is a real-world example where my model applies.
You probably know me as somebody who’s written a game theory book, so I’ll reveal an ulterior motive: I’m trying to tempt you to read the paper, because I think it’s a good one and I want you to cite it. Revealing this to you will not affect you if you’re a rational player. (This last sentence is also manipulative, but, again, if you’re rational, you don’t mind being manipulated so long as I’m honest.)
p.s.: If you do give me good comments and want another reward, I’m willing to provide you with the answer for another EJMR thread, “What’s the point of trying to date a single woman in her 40’s?”