Kirk is there anything you can do about proxy voting?
What's the deal with Arrow's Impossibility Theorem?
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Call me a troll and no good me all you want, I will produce one last post.
Consider pairwise majority voting on single-peaked preferences. Assume 3 alternatives and odd number of voters. Now let the voter i in the middle be pivotal, preferences of earlier voter set to a>b>c, preferences of the later voters set to c>b>a. Now voter i is a dictator! We have just proved that majority voting doesn't work even for preferences restricted to single-peaked!
But does it matter? Of course not. What matters is that in this case, this SWF will always produce transitive outcomes, it will satisfy pareto efficiency and so on without being a "dictatorship" (most of the time so to speak).
This is all I wanted to say, bring those "no goods" you parrots..
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What's the deal with this Arrow impossibility theorem? Well, let me explain it to you, schmuck. See, there is this schlump who owes us money who needs to get taken out. I give you this bow and you go out in the alley. Vinnie has gone to Joisey to get this really special arrow that will do the job of putting this schlump out of his memory and keep all de rest of dese joiks in line. But if Vinnie can't get this arrow, well, it will be impossible for you to do the job, see?
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